Good question that I think gets quite knotty. You've called something the "non-conceptual". This itself is a conceptualising. You've drawn a boundary around all the things yet to be conceptualised (or that cannot be conceptualised). I'm sure it is possible to study this in an abstract sense — Heidegger's work on Being and Peterson conceptualising of Chaos come to mind as attempts to do so. Still, in approaching this non-conceptual space we end up conceptualising it. It seems we might come to the old Eastern idea of confusing the finger pointing with the moon it is pointing at. I suspect this is also why Heidegger after "the Turn" is much more concerned with poetry as a way of getting to Being. In a way that could be said to be transcending philosophy
Nice! And you are right, it seems that concepts is all that we can think of, and the non-conceptual is yet another concept, if albeit abstract and indeterminate. What it says is this: The concept's content, what we may call its object, or the object in general, consists of two parts, one part is conceptual, while the other is not. The former we can grasp with concepts - we can think it, the latter eludes all our efforts of conceptualisation - cannot be thought at all. What this means is that our concepts, however refined they are, do not exhaust the object in question. So if one subscribes to this rather simple proposition, what are the implications? It is basically a what-if scenario, because we might as well be wrong, and, as it happens, concepts may indeed exhaust their objects, but we haven't reached this state yet, philosophically speaking, just as science still has a lot of discoveries to do.
But if the proposition above is true, I think you are correct in noting that then things get quite knotty, and naughty, if I may add! :) How would one explore and study this non-conceptual space, by means of concepts?
I am not well versed in Heidegger's work, so I don't know what he means by Being, but if his effort of getting to Being is pointing at the non-conceptual, then it seems that poetry was what he believed the tool to do so, as you say.
It occured to me that Semiotics is very relevant here in which there's a tripartite distinction between the signifier (the word), the signified (the concept) and the referent (the IRL object). I find the term Referent helpful here because it puts us back on that Eastern idea of the finger pointing at the moon — the moon being referred to by the pointer. It also tells us that the concept doesn't contain the object but merely points to it. Better framing I think (it also allows concepts that have no referent like Harry Potter which is fun. These signifieds can have true/false statements made about them even without having a "real" referent. Of course we're not far away from the mathematical debate about the existence of maths as referent or signified — very knotty and naughty philosophical waters indeed!). This does however raise the Wittgenstein Dilemma "the limits of my language means the limits of my world". This is the ground postmodernists stomped around on a lot — to what extent does language create the world. Foucault especially is all about this but Baudrillard as well
What do you have in mind when you say concepts could exhaust the object? Do you mean fully capture it?
Actually another idea that comes to mind is the difference between known unknowns (e.g. a room temperature superconductor. We know it's theoretically possible but are yet to find a real instantiation) and unknown unknowns (black swan events — things outside our model of the world that slap us in the face e.g. 9/11, Covid)
I'm far from a Heidegger expert but his attempts to grasp Being is an attempt to reach beyond all beings and approach that thing which is the ground of it all. I'll talk more about this I'm sure as my Heidegger studies bear more fruit
Semiotics is certainly relevant, but I think it is only a philosophical tool, a way for philosophical presentation or style, and besides it certainly does not make explicit that the referent the finger is pointing at, is not actually the referent. If it did, it would be saying something alike that the concept doesn't contain the object. You could upgrade semiotics to a philosophical theory this way, I suppose, but why do that, and not leave semiotics as a mere tool?
Wittgenstein stresses the tension of "the limits of my language means the limits of my world" with "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence": the non-conceptual is something we cannot think of, let alone speak, and so leave it at that, a form of quietism. If you are into Baudrillard, then you might like Adorno and Horkheimer, they were his predecessors, so to speak, they are all lumped into the school of critical theory, Baudrillard is, under this categorization, 3rd generation, with Adorno and Horkheimer the 1st, and Habermas and Foucault the 2nd. My focus is with the 1st, which I don't think was fully explored by the next generations.
Yes exactly, by "concepts don't exhaust the object", I mean that they don't fully capture it. It is a failure on behalf of concepts, one that philosophy should be aware of, which is all about concepts. It is what spurred my initial comment, because I think that what philosophy needs is not more concepts - which are wonderfull -, but the awareness that there is something problematic with the very idea of concepts. This awareness, is, as I believe, what delineates good from bad philosophy. The problem with concepts goes way back to Plato, as is exhibited in Plato's seventh letter, 341b–345c, where he talks of the five instruments of knowledge.
I may be misunderstanding this point, correct me if I am, but "it certainly does not make explicit that the referent the finger is pointing at, is not actually the referent" I think semiotics does separate the signified from the referent. The concept doesn't contain the object, it merely points. This is my semiotic reading anyway.
Either way I see it as a philosophical tool. That's the way I see all these things these days. The theories are just meta-tools — maps, narratives that have more or less pragmatic value (as with Kuhn's paradigms).
I don't know that I'd put Baudrillard in the category of Critical Theory. Or hmm I think I'm being historically pedantic here but obviously in hindsight for the Critical Theory of the 90s onwards he is a part of it but from Baudrillard and Foucault's experience they matured outside that paradigm. Foucault wrote about discovering Habermas later (late 70s?) and feeling a sense of mourning that he hadn't discovered him earlier. The French postmodernists weren't schooled on the Frankfurters though many were later schooled on a diet of both.
I am curious about Horkheimer and Adorno but after Heidegger, Deleuze and Hegel are my next deep dives.
As for your main point I can see what you mean. I have been taken in by the thirst for propositional knowledge too much and without friendship, beauty, music and love it's worth nothing and these things are far from exhausted by concepts. They must be experienced and lived. But linguistic beings we are, they can't be cut off from the conceptual either (though I think the opposite mistake is more common and people are more likely to be ensnared in an overly intellectual life than an excessively experiential one)
This sounds like a great idea! Looking forward to it.
Let me know if you’re looking for any guest writers. Excited about the new series.
Thanks Enda and a guest post from your self would be delightful. I can really see how it would fit in with the series
Deleuze is another one of my favorites. His particular insights are always valuable and have plenty of research and creativity backing them.
Creativity isn’t always a word you associate with philosophers but it fits perfectly on Deleuze
What about the non-conceptual?
Good question that I think gets quite knotty. You've called something the "non-conceptual". This itself is a conceptualising. You've drawn a boundary around all the things yet to be conceptualised (or that cannot be conceptualised). I'm sure it is possible to study this in an abstract sense — Heidegger's work on Being and Peterson conceptualising of Chaos come to mind as attempts to do so. Still, in approaching this non-conceptual space we end up conceptualising it. It seems we might come to the old Eastern idea of confusing the finger pointing with the moon it is pointing at. I suspect this is also why Heidegger after "the Turn" is much more concerned with poetry as a way of getting to Being. In a way that could be said to be transcending philosophy
Nice! And you are right, it seems that concepts is all that we can think of, and the non-conceptual is yet another concept, if albeit abstract and indeterminate. What it says is this: The concept's content, what we may call its object, or the object in general, consists of two parts, one part is conceptual, while the other is not. The former we can grasp with concepts - we can think it, the latter eludes all our efforts of conceptualisation - cannot be thought at all. What this means is that our concepts, however refined they are, do not exhaust the object in question. So if one subscribes to this rather simple proposition, what are the implications? It is basically a what-if scenario, because we might as well be wrong, and, as it happens, concepts may indeed exhaust their objects, but we haven't reached this state yet, philosophically speaking, just as science still has a lot of discoveries to do.
But if the proposition above is true, I think you are correct in noting that then things get quite knotty, and naughty, if I may add! :) How would one explore and study this non-conceptual space, by means of concepts?
I am not well versed in Heidegger's work, so I don't know what he means by Being, but if his effort of getting to Being is pointing at the non-conceptual, then it seems that poetry was what he believed the tool to do so, as you say.
It occured to me that Semiotics is very relevant here in which there's a tripartite distinction between the signifier (the word), the signified (the concept) and the referent (the IRL object). I find the term Referent helpful here because it puts us back on that Eastern idea of the finger pointing at the moon — the moon being referred to by the pointer. It also tells us that the concept doesn't contain the object but merely points to it. Better framing I think (it also allows concepts that have no referent like Harry Potter which is fun. These signifieds can have true/false statements made about them even without having a "real" referent. Of course we're not far away from the mathematical debate about the existence of maths as referent or signified — very knotty and naughty philosophical waters indeed!). This does however raise the Wittgenstein Dilemma "the limits of my language means the limits of my world". This is the ground postmodernists stomped around on a lot — to what extent does language create the world. Foucault especially is all about this but Baudrillard as well
What do you have in mind when you say concepts could exhaust the object? Do you mean fully capture it?
Actually another idea that comes to mind is the difference between known unknowns (e.g. a room temperature superconductor. We know it's theoretically possible but are yet to find a real instantiation) and unknown unknowns (black swan events — things outside our model of the world that slap us in the face e.g. 9/11, Covid)
I'm far from a Heidegger expert but his attempts to grasp Being is an attempt to reach beyond all beings and approach that thing which is the ground of it all. I'll talk more about this I'm sure as my Heidegger studies bear more fruit
Semiotics is certainly relevant, but I think it is only a philosophical tool, a way for philosophical presentation or style, and besides it certainly does not make explicit that the referent the finger is pointing at, is not actually the referent. If it did, it would be saying something alike that the concept doesn't contain the object. You could upgrade semiotics to a philosophical theory this way, I suppose, but why do that, and not leave semiotics as a mere tool?
Wittgenstein stresses the tension of "the limits of my language means the limits of my world" with "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence": the non-conceptual is something we cannot think of, let alone speak, and so leave it at that, a form of quietism. If you are into Baudrillard, then you might like Adorno and Horkheimer, they were his predecessors, so to speak, they are all lumped into the school of critical theory, Baudrillard is, under this categorization, 3rd generation, with Adorno and Horkheimer the 1st, and Habermas and Foucault the 2nd. My focus is with the 1st, which I don't think was fully explored by the next generations.
Yes exactly, by "concepts don't exhaust the object", I mean that they don't fully capture it. It is a failure on behalf of concepts, one that philosophy should be aware of, which is all about concepts. It is what spurred my initial comment, because I think that what philosophy needs is not more concepts - which are wonderfull -, but the awareness that there is something problematic with the very idea of concepts. This awareness, is, as I believe, what delineates good from bad philosophy. The problem with concepts goes way back to Plato, as is exhibited in Plato's seventh letter, 341b–345c, where he talks of the five instruments of knowledge.
I may be misunderstanding this point, correct me if I am, but "it certainly does not make explicit that the referent the finger is pointing at, is not actually the referent" I think semiotics does separate the signified from the referent. The concept doesn't contain the object, it merely points. This is my semiotic reading anyway.
Either way I see it as a philosophical tool. That's the way I see all these things these days. The theories are just meta-tools — maps, narratives that have more or less pragmatic value (as with Kuhn's paradigms).
I don't know that I'd put Baudrillard in the category of Critical Theory. Or hmm I think I'm being historically pedantic here but obviously in hindsight for the Critical Theory of the 90s onwards he is a part of it but from Baudrillard and Foucault's experience they matured outside that paradigm. Foucault wrote about discovering Habermas later (late 70s?) and feeling a sense of mourning that he hadn't discovered him earlier. The French postmodernists weren't schooled on the Frankfurters though many were later schooled on a diet of both.
I am curious about Horkheimer and Adorno but after Heidegger, Deleuze and Hegel are my next deep dives.
As for your main point I can see what you mean. I have been taken in by the thirst for propositional knowledge too much and without friendship, beauty, music and love it's worth nothing and these things are far from exhausted by concepts. They must be experienced and lived. But linguistic beings we are, they can't be cut off from the conceptual either (though I think the opposite mistake is more common and people are more likely to be ensnared in an overly intellectual life than an excessively experiential one)